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An inquiry into the political structure
and process of a country is the study of,
in the classic words of Harold D. Lasswell,
"who gets what, when and how" in that
country. These concepts are also true in
Thai politics. This article does not aim to
analyze extensively the politics in Thailand,
but rather to propose an analytical frame-
work from which, hopefully, further studies
may be pursued. The proposed framework
deals largely with the budget appropriations
and the implications concerning how they
have been arrived at within the political
decision-making process of the government
of Thailand.
Premises and Assutnpt-ions
A budget statement or policy is among the
most important statements or policies of
a government. It contains clearly ex-
pressed governmental plans and purposes
with price tags attached. Moreover, it is a
formal expreSSIOn of the government's
decisions about the authoritative allocation
of resources in a political system. There-
fore, an inquiry into government budgeting
* The writer is indebted to Dr. John R. Van
Wingen for his advice and comments on the
framework as presented in this article. Any
error that may exist is the writer's responsibility.
** Civil Service Training Institute, Office of the
Civil Service Commission, Government of
Thailand, Pitsanulok Rd., Bangkok, Thailand
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IS an analysis of role interrelationships
among components of the governmental
process and the larger political system.
Accordingly, an understanding of the factors
that influence the level and distribution of
budget appropriations should illuminate
such interrelationships within both the for-
mal governmental process and the larger
political system.
Important questions must be answered,
if one is to examine the budgetary allocations
and appropriations. These include: Who
has the authority and responsibility for
decisions about allocations of public funds?
What factors influence those authorities in
making budgetary decisions? How does
the budget policy as an output of the
political system reflect the characteristics
of the political and governmental processes?
Financial resources for political decision-
making are very limited in most countries.
A government's budget decisions often
reflect efforts to allocate such limited funds
through the political process. 1) Therefore,
a budget must record the outcome of the
political struggle over "who gets what."
The outcome must mirror the political
strengths of the major governmental insti-
tutions. Thus, Aaron Wildavsky states:
1) Political process is defined as a process of strug-
gle over which preferences are to prevail in the
determination of policy.
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Since the amounts requested often
have an effect on the amount received,
budget proposals are often strategies.
The total sum of money and its distri-
bution among various activities may be
designed to have a favorable impact in
support of an organization's goals. As
each participant acts on the budget he
receives information on the preferences
of others and communicates his own
desires through the choices he makes.
Here a budget emerges as a network of
communications in which information is
being continuously generated and fed
back to the participants. Once enacted
a budget becomes a precedent; the fact
that something has been done before
vastly increases the chance that it will
be done again [Wildavsky 19G8: 192].
The Approaches
Several factors originating from within
and from outside the boundaries of the
political process affect the authoritative
allocation of scarce resources. Systems
theory provides a means for analyzing these
factors. Systems theory views public policy
(such as budget policy and appropriations)
as a response by the political system to forces
brought to bear upon it from the environ-
ment. Forces generated in the environment
are viewed as inputs of the political system.
The environment is any condition or circum-
stance existing outside the boundaries of
the political system. The political system
(hlackbox) consists of groups or interrelated
structures and processes through which
inputs are authoritatively allocated for
a society. The authoritative allocations are
then defined as outputs of the system, and
these outputs constitute public policy.
Feedback occurs as the outputs influence
the environment in a way that affects the
inputs going from the environment to the
political system. Through the process of
feedback, decision-makers can evaluate
their decisions and activities and hence may
adapt new decisions and activities as
a reaction to the assessed effects which
earlier outputs had upon the environment.
Systems theory portrays the budget as
an output of the political system. As
David Easton writes:
(A political system) is a terminal point
in the intricate process through which
demands and supports (inputs] are con-
verted into decisions and actions Cout-
puts]. To use the simple analogy of
a manufacturing system... the outputs
were viewed as the products forthcoming
from the conversion operations performed
on the mixture of items going into the
system [Easton 1965: 344].
Accordingly, a comprehensive analysis
of the budget would entail the description
and explanation of both causes and con-
sequences. This involves (1) a description
of the content of the budget, (2) an assess-
ment of the impact of environmental forces
on the budget's content, (3) an analysis of
the effect of various institutional arrange-
ments and political processes upon the
budget, (4) an inquiry into the budget's
consequences for the political system, and
(5) an evaluation of the budget's impact
on the society [Dye 1972: 3]. This means
that budget appropriations can be conceived
of either as a dependent variable (asking
443
what and how the environment and the
political conversion process shape its con-
tent) or as an independent variable (asking
what impact or consequences the budget has
on the environment and the political system).
Because of the severely limited data
collection and statistical records available
in Thailand, a comprehensive analysis of
those reciprocal linkages among the en-
vironment, the political system, and budget
policy is not possible. Consequently, the
proposed framework given in following
paragraphs is limited to linkages between
governmental institutions and the budget.
Systems theory renders us a technique
for systematically studying governmental
decision-making in terms of budget policy.
Most political decision-making activities,
however, can be described and explained in
terms of a smaller structure than the entire
political system. 2) The political system
is not only closely interconnected with
other systems such as the economic system
but is also a subsystem of the social system.
Similarly, within the political system itself
there exists a number of subsystems, such
as political parties, interest groups, and the
bureaucracy. Many times budget decisions
are described as interactions among these
subsystemic actors of the political system.
An analysis of budget policy should as-
certain the characteristics, roles, and contri-
2) See Michael A. Weinstein, Systematic Polit£cal
Theory (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Company,
1971), Chapter 3; Robert A. Dahl [1965: 9,
30-371; Oran R. Young, Systems of Political
Science (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968),
p. 17; Yehezkel Dror [1968]; and Gabriel
Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Polt'tz'cs: A Developmental Approach (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1966).
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butions of the major subsystems involved
in the budgetary process. The politics of
these subsystems are the politics of function,
where the issues are handled immediately
and directly [Redford 1969: 96-106].
"The quality of aggregative policymaking,"
writes Yehezkel Dror, "depends in part
on the quality of the discrete policy-making
carried on by these substructures.... "
Hence, continues Dror, "The characteristics
of the separate contributions of these sub-
structures and their relative weights greatly
determine the quality of public policy-
making; therefore, they constitute an im-
portant criterion of great practical useful-
ness" [Drar 1968: 54].
One must, however, do more than
describe these subsystems; one must also
consider how much autonomy they enjoy.
Obviously, political systems will "vary a
great deal in the extent to which various
subsystems within their boundaries enjoy
autonomy" [Dahl 1965: 35]. The two
extremes for subsystemic autonomy would
be the democratic political systems such as
the United States and Britain and the
modern tyrannies. In the democracies,
a great variety of their subsystems have
enjoyed considerable autonomy in handling
vanous Issues. In the tyrannies, such as
Uganda under Idi Amin, all political
subsystems were agents of the systemic
dictatorship. A major point we obtain
from these two extremes is that in contrast
to Uganda where the self-interests of
President Idi Amin have prevailed over
the public, the democracies have attempted
to represent the public interests by encourag-
ing all interests to compete openly with
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other interests [Redford 1969: 102-106].3)
Thailand's political system falls some-
where between these two extremes. As will
be discussed later, the Thai political system
is classified in terms of subsystems' auton-
omy as being between the democratic and
totalitarian extremes. It is often labeled
a "bureaucratic polity"-defined by Fred W.
Riggs as a polity in which the official class
as a ruling class has dominated the entire
system even though formal constitutional
charters have given the people modern
ideas of popular sovereignty-since a great
variety of the subsystems have been ar-
ranged and are closely supervised by the
powerful bureaucracy. 4) This is primarily
due to the lack of institutionalized "extra-
bureaucratic political institutions," l.e.,
political parties, interest groups, a stable
legislative body, and an independent judicial
body which are able to check and balance
the powerful bureaucratic establishments.
The Thai bureaucracy has thus enjoyed
a high prestige and considerable autonomy
3) Emmette S. Redford [1969] summarized four
propositions concerning the autonomous subsys-
tems in a democratic political system as follows:
First, subsystems provide stability for existing
equilibriums among interests. Second, sub-
systems provide continuous access and superior
opportunities for influence to high-quality,
aggregated interests. Third, subsystems
provide some access and presentation to interests
that are not dominant. Fourth, substantial
changes in the balances among interests served
by subsystems can be expected to occur only
through macropolitical intervention that modifies
the rules and roles operating in the systems.
4) For a discussion of this fact, see Fred W. Riggs,
"Bureaucracy and Political Development: A
Paradoxical View," in Bureaucracy and Political
Development, ed. by Joseph LaPalombara
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
and has become the dominant group
exercIsmg power over all other political
groups. Even though the Thai bureauc-
racy is, by definition, a substructure of the
larger political system, it nevertheless plays
the dual roles of making policy and im-
plementing policy.
The proposed framework set forth hence
will treat the Thai Budgetary appropri-
ations particularly during the period of
1960-1980 as "dependent variables." The
relationships among components of the
government process and the larger political
system will be "independent variables."
This leads us to two broad perspectives of
analysis. The first perspective is that Thai
budgetary appropriations represent the allo-
cation decisions of the Thai bureaucrats.
In this case, the government's ministries
and agencies with strong bases of political
support will acquire larger shares of these
budgetary appropriations. The second
perspective is that the Thai budget policy
and the appropriations are results of
economic, governmental, and political
phenomena within the society. These two
distinctive perspectives are explained in




The first perspective assumes that the
political system of contemporary Thailand
has been dominated by its bureaucratic
subsystem. This uniqueness IS a con-
sequence of the historical evolution in Thai
political and administrative systems. The
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tradition of absolutism left the lines of
authority clear. The king, who was a god-
like monarch, had absolute power; the
bureaucracy was the king's tool, a passive
administrative instrument that could be
used at his discretion. This differentiation
between the role of the king and the role
of the bureaucracy lead to a system of
nepotism. The king, being absolute, often
appointed his relatives and high nobles to
high and prestigious positions in the Thai
bureaucracy, e.g., governor. Moreover the
traditional system equated rank and position
with the status and wealth of each bureau-
crat. Although administrative reform
introduced important structural improve-
ments in the traditional system, the reforms
did little to deter the practice of nepotism. 5)
The Revolution of 1932 did not transform
the country into a modern democratic state.
Democratic institutions were created, yet
the political system that emerged was
practically the same as before. The king's
absolute power was divided among three
branches as was required by the first
constitution of 1932. The constitution
made clear, however, that the executive
branch was to be superior and that the
bureaucracy would be a tool of the executive.
The Thai political system remained authori-
tarian, and the public continued to believe
that "authority comes from above." 6)
Consequently, the public, III the pre-
dominantly agrarian Thai economy, was
politically apathetic, and "extra-political"
5) See William J. Siffin [1966].
6) See Thawatt Mokkrapong, "The June 1932
Revolution: A Study of Political Behavior"
(Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Indiana
University, Bloomington, 1960).
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institutions-political parties and well organ-
ized interest groups-failed to develop.
As a scholar comments:
When the monarchy faltered and royal
authority was overthrown, ... the rather
alien idea of popular control of the state
was substituted for the ancient and
admittedly limited and outworn monarch-
ism. But parliamentary democracy, as
a process wherein diverse aroused social
interests are expressed through organi-
zations outside the government and are
synthesized by representative institutions
into a statement of the public power, has
not emerged III Thailand. Interest
groups, such as they are, remain weak
because Thailand rests firmly on a tradi-
tional agrarian socio-economic base
[Wilson 1967: 277].
The political system has continued to be
authoritarian. The system is dominated
by a bureaucratic oligarchy that plays the
dual roles of making and administering
policy. This oligarchy, which has usually
had a majority of military officials, has
controlled the Council of Ministers (Cabi-
net). The Council "is the institutional focus
of power in the Thai political system, both
in law and in fact" [ibid.: 143]. Further-
more, as Riggs indicates:
Without external centers of power
capable of controlling the bureaucracy,
the main arena of political rivalry in
Thailand has come to be the cabinet as
a ruling comlllittee of the effective heads
of the ministries with their respective
departments, including the armed forces,
which form the apex of bureaucratic
authority [Riggs 1966: 380].
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Another unique characteristic of Thai
political practice is what is called "politics
of cliques." A clique consists of individuals
who are bound together by personal love,
loyalty and respect that is based upon a
hierarchical relationship between a leader
and followers. The leader is at the apex of
the hierarchy. The politics are thus power
struggles among competing cliques [Wilson
1967: 116]. The motivation for these
conflicts is often simply the higher status
that will accrue if the clique can influence or
control the cabinet.
Cliques will be found not only in the
cabinet but also among high ranking
bureaucrats who aspire to cabinet status.
Riggs observed that almost all cabinet
members had at one time been bureaucrats
who had aspired to political eminence.
Once they became cabinet members, these
former bureaucrats were much more respon-
sive to their bureaucratic constituents, who
were also members of their clique, than to
the populous as a whole. Consequently,
the cabinet has tended to respond to the de-
mands of the bureaucracy instead of the
demands of interest groups, political parties,
or even the representative assembly.
Wilson summanzes the situation as
follows:
... the role the cabinet plays in policy
formulation and implementation ...arises
from [their relationships with the bu-
reaucracyJ which in turn is determined
by the character of the power complex in
Thai society. The ruling clique seizes
the seats of power by a sudden coup and
then uses these positions to establish and
maintain its authority. But the constit-
uencies of the members of the clique are
of the bureaucracy itself. These are
primarily the military ... (and], to a greater
or lesser extent, all agencies. A minister,
when he steps into his ministry, possesses
the traditional authority of the office, and
he can expect to get the deference, respect,
and obedience from his subordinates
which tradition demands. He is obli-
gated by tradition to look out for these
subordinates, however. In order not to
disturb his authority and perhaps that
of the whole clique, he must look to this
obligation. His ministry then becomes
his constituency, and he represents it
in the cabinet. He fights for its budget,
and he protects its employees. The
success with which he does this depends
upon his relative position within the ruling
clique, although the best he can expect
is a compromise with his fellow minis-
ters [z"bz"d.: 161].
These characteristics of Thai politics are
what some scholars have labeled, "bureau-
cratic politics" in a "bureaucratic polity."
Subsystemz"c Pohtz"cs: Its Norms and
Values
The Thai bureaucracy, then, is the major
subsystem of the larger political system and
of Thai society. Presumably, the network
of supportive arrangements within this
important political subsystem reflects the
central values of Thai society. These
values will include the norms and criteria
by which political and administrative be-
havior is regulated. A dichotomy between
politics and administration does not exist
since cliques provide a means through which
the bureaucracy is involved in policy [or-
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mation as well as policy implementation.
Since diverse and potent forces outside the
bureaucratic establishment are lacking, the
discovery of the dominant social value
orientations of the Thai bureaucracy will
be the key to understanding the intrinsic
characteristics of the bureaucratic polity.
W. J. Siffin found that hierarchical status,
personalism, and security are the three
dominant social values of Thai bureaucracy
[Siffin 1966: 161-163]. Hierarchicalism
has been inherited from the traditional rule.
rts presence is evidenced by the fact that
"the bureaucratic system is to a considerable
degree organized and operated to give
meaning and support to status" [ibid.: 161].
This has a consequence for the administra-
tive structure of government. All govern-
mental functions are formally integrated
in the hierarchical structure of several
ministries; each ministry is hierarchically
divided into departments, divisions, and
sections. This hierarchical structure dis-
courages lateral interdependence among
the ministries and the departments. Fur-
thermore, the departments tend to be self-
contained operational units that are staffed
by civil servants with stratified positions,
ranks, and status.
The second dominant value of the Thai
bureaucracy is personalism. Bureaucratic
behavior in Thailand is primarily informal
and personal. Personal ties and face-to-
face discussions are emphasized instead of
formal rules and regulations and the
impersonal discharge of duties that are key
elements to Weber's ideal bureaucracy.
In Thailand personalism coupled with
hierarchicalism becomes the basis for author-
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ity. "(T)he source of authority is personal;
the response is personal; ...and the sub-
stantive concerns of the parties to the re-
lationship are to some degree status-centered
rather than achievement-oriented" [ibid.:
167].
Security or the "desire to preserve one's
membership" is the third eminent value of
the Thai bureaucracy. Its significance,
wrote Siffin, "lies partly in the fact that
the bureaucracy is a way of life and a source
of status, and that there are few, if any,
attractive alternatives to the bureaucracy
within the large society" [ibid.: 162J.
Overstaffing of agencies is thus an accepted
practice.
These three dominant social values are
closely intermingled and very supportive
of each other. As Siffin says:
...hierarchical status, personalism, and
security are all reflected in the arrange-
ment by which personnel and other
resources are procured for the Thai
bureaucracy. Status is a potent force
which makes the bureaucracy attractive
in the face of more renumerative alter-
natives which are available outside it.
Advancement in hierarchical status IS
usually the key to increased material
rewards for members of the system.
There is little or no real conflict between
status norms and productivity norms in
the procurement of resources, simply
because authority is inherent in status,
and status is not determinantly linked
with productivity [ibid.: 175].
Politz'cs of Budgetz'ng
The politics of cliques and the bureau-
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cratic polity's values of hierarchical status,
personalism, and security affect budgetary
politics. A budget allocates limited fi-
nancial resources to governmental agencies.
Budget proposals by agencies tend to be
strategies for maintaining or increasing
the amount of money available to the
agency. The budgetary process can thus
be conceptualized as a network of inter-
actions or communications among the
agencies, rather than as a rational means
for achieving the stated objectives of the
governmental regime.
Three norms tend to guide the Thai
budgetary process [ibid.: 171-1/'2]. These
norms provide the rules of the game by
which the politics of budgeting is played.
The first norm is that "only high status
persons may properly propose significant
changes in, or additions to, the established
pattern of resource assignment." At times,
an agency's budget request is significantly
altered by the individual minister who s~b­
mits the final budget proposal, even after
the request has been screened by the Budget
Bureau. Since the Thai political system
lacks extrabureaucratic power centers that
can bring systematic pressure upon the
government for budget changes and since
the value of hierarchical status prevents the
agency from demanding significant changes
in its budget, only ministers and other
highly placed bureaucrats have the status
to propose significant alterations in the allo-
cation of resources.
The second norm IS that "adjustments
in the existing pattern of claims on re-
sources tend to be made on a personal
basis." Most budgetary decisions are made
informally during face-to-face discussions.
Consequently, even though national inter-
ests such as national symbols, prestige, and
survival are often mentioned, favoritism
toward members of one's clique is wide-
spread. Specific program goals are not as
compelling as they are supposed to be for
allocating the governmental resources.
The third norm is that "little or no
justification is required for the continuation
of established resource allocations so long
as governmental revenues do not shrink."
Although the Budgetary Procedure Act
of 1959 established a basis for performance
budgeting, the bureaucracy has customarily
failed to generate the data that is necessary
for the continuous and systematic assess-
ment of competing budget proposals. In-
stead of analyzing existing programs, these
established resource allocations are ac-
cepted as being legitimate. This guaranteed
funding base provides security for the
participants in the bureaucratic system.
Within these norms each governmental
agency emerges in strategic activities to
secure its budgetary goals. These budget
strategies "are the links between the
intentions and perceptions of budget officials
and the political system that imposes re-
straints and creates opportunities for them"
[Wildavsky 1969: 63]. Budgetary strate-
gies are, as Wildavsky suggests, of two
types. The first is ubiquitous strategies.
The second type is contingent strategies
[ibid.: Chapter 3].
Because of the rapidly changing environ-
ment of the Thai political system, no
ubiquitous budgetary strategies exist.
Emphasis upon national development and
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modernization of the budgetary system has
kept government agencies in a state of flux.
The volatility of cabinet level politics
(systemic politics) compound the agencies'
difficulties in developing an ubiquitous
strategy that will guarantee the desired
funding level. 7) Outcomes of the politics
of budgeting in Thailand can thus be
analyzed as "bureaucratic allocations."
According to this view the budget decisions
reflect the relative power positions of
bureaucratic elites rather than the pressures
of public demand. The Council of Minis-
ters is the major political arena in which the
conflicting and expanding claims over
public funds are settled. Since com-
promise, bargaining, and logrolling are the
means used to settle the conflicts, it would
be expected that the budgetary process m










In incremental decision-making only modest
changes in the previous year's appropria-
tions are discussed. In this way decision-
makers narrow the range of goals prefer-
ences, alternatives as well as information
that is necessary for making decisions.
Incrementalism is a political expedient.
Compromise over various claims becomes
7) See explanation and description on those em-
ployed strategies in Chai Anan Samudavanija
[19711·
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easier because all participants concentrate
on incremental modifications only. Partici-
pants, in this case the bureaucratic elites,
are more likely to be satisfied with mcre-
mental increases than with nothing. Con-
sequently, political conflicts among bureauc-
racies are reduced, and a certain stability
in government is maintained in spite of the
numerous regime changes that have oc-
curred. Bureaucratic allocations give the
Thai political system the continuity which
is necessary for its survival.
Perspective 2 :
Systemic Politics and Rationalism
The second perspective assumes that
Thai budget policy and appropriations are
blended results of economic, governmental,
and political phenomena within the society.
In this regard, the first perspective of
analysis is not comprehensive. As a result,
recent research indicates that "bureaucratic
allocations" do not satisfactorily explain
the Thai budgetary process [Samudavanija
1971]. They do not explain, for example,
what and how environmental factors and
conditions of the system affect or determine
the contents of budget policy. Moreover,
the first perspective ignores any consider-
ations the government has used in planning
and developing its budget priorities. The
impact of factors such as these cannot be
satisfactorily explained by the processes of
bureaucratic allocations and incrementalism.
Like other budgetary systems, the Thai
system is complex. Interrelated structures
of policymaking are influenced by factors
and conditions both in and out of the
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political system. To simplify analysis,
systems theory perceives the political system
as a "blackbox" receiving public demands
and then converting them into policy
outputs. During this conversion process,
the "blackbox" must not only synthesize
demands but also articulate the national
goals and political objectives by which the
demands can be analyzed. The budget
policy is the single most important policy
of the government as it explicitly expresses
national goals and political objectives.
Accordingly, budget formulation and autho-
rization is highly political and the appro-
priations must reflect maximization the
stated political objectives and priorities of
the government in power. But who is the
"blackbox" ?
According to Emmette S. Redford,
macro-level politics "arises when the com-
munity at large and the leaders of the
government as a whole are brought into the
discussion and determination of policy"
[Redford 1969: 83]. In the American polit-
ical system, those identified macropolitical
actors are the two national parties, the
President, the department heads (the
Cabinet), and the congressional leaders
[ibid.: 107~109]. In the British parlia-
mentary system the instruments are the
Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister, the
national parties, and the Parliament.
These are the instruments of the conversion
process of the "blackbox" in the systemic
analysis. In Thailand, the political system
has failed to maintain the stability of a
parliamentary system; the Thai Cabinet
and the Prime Minister have exercised
power over other potential instruments of
macropolitics such as the legislature and
the political parties. Thus, the Prime
lVIinister and his Cabinet are the only
purposeful macropolitical agents and rep-
resent the "blackbox."
The identification of the Prime Minister
and his Cabinet as purposeful agents
"involves a simple extension of the pervasive
everyday assumption that what human be-
ings do is at least 'intendedly rational,'
an assumption fundamental to most under-
standing of human behavior" [Allison
1971: 28].
Accordingly, the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet must think of their decision-making
as "intendedly rational." Such rationality
must exhibit (1) "consistency among goals
and objectives relative to a particular
action," and (2) "consistency in the appli-
cation of principles in order to select the
optimal alternative" [ibid.: 29J. In short,
the macropolitical or systemic political
process involves "choice behavior." The
leaders of the government are rational and
must decide among alternative courses of
action. 8 ) Thus, to choose rationally "is to
select the most efficient alternative, that is,
the alternative that maximizes output for
a given input" [Zoc. cit.]. The rational
decision-maker must select the best possible
means whose consequences maximize the
political values of the regime. Therefore,
"rationality refers to consistent, value
maximizing choice within specified con-
8) See Robert H. Salisbury, "The Analysis of
PuLlic Policies: A Search for Theories and
Roles," in Political Scz'ence and Public Policies,
ed. by Austin Renney (Chicago: Markham,
1968), pp. 152-154; and Dror [1968: Part IV:
An Optimal Model of Public Policy Making].
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straints" [ibid.: 30].
A historical review of Thailand's political
evolution since the ancient regime verifies
the above messages. Under the ancient,
absolute regime (prior to 1932), a king
totally controlled the government. The
government's goals were whatever the king
prescribed. Such absolute rule often re-
sulted in a rational decision-making process
whose purpose was to maximize the king's
values and objectives.
This traditional mode of political leader-
ship, with decisions made at the highest
levels, remained even after the 1932
revolution. Several political coups have
followed. These coups were under
strong military leadership. Since the 1932
revolution, Thailand has experienced ten
military coups and has been governed
under eleven different constitutions. The
military, particularly the army, has ruled
and played a dominant role in the politics
of Thailand. They were, moreover, made
legal by their self-proclaimed constitutions.
Thus, the 1932 revolution was actually the
coup which can best be viewed as a bureau-
cratic revolt against the absolute monarchy,
not against authoritarian rule.
During the period of 1960-1980 Thailand
experienced seven different political
regimes: (1) military dictatorial regimes,
1960-1968; (2) a military constitutional
regime, 1968-1971; (3) another military
dictatorial regime, 1971-1973; (4) civilian
constitutional regimes, 1973-1976; (5) civil-
ian authoritarian regime (with military
support), 1976-1977; (6) military dictatorial
regime, 1977-1979; (7) military consti-
tutional regimes, 1979-1980. 9 ) While the
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1968-1971 regime was a step forward in
terms of constitutional development, the
1971-1973 was a step backward. The
1973-1976 regimes were other moves toward
a genuine democratic system in which the
influence of the military was kept at
a minimum. However, the civilian rule
was incapable of maintaining support and
was overthrown by another military coup
III 1976. The authoritarian government
set up immediately after the 1976 coup,
under a civilian's leadership, was replaced
by another military dictatorship in 1977.
The new military government under the
premiership of Army General Kriengsak
was peacefully replaced by another consti-
tutional regime but with the Ge;;'eral remain-
ing as its Premier. Parliamentary support
of the second Kriengsak government was
so rapidly decreasing by early 1980 that the
General had to resign from the post.
Shortly after, the General's Minister of
Defense, General Prem Tinsulanond, was
overwhelmingly supported by the Parlia-
ment and the public to take charge as the
new Prime Minister.
Presumably, those authoritarian regimes
with different political leaderships were not
the same in their purposes and priorities.
9) However, during the period 1960-1980 there
have been altogether 11 different governments:
1. Sarit's dictatorship government
2. Thanom's dictatorship government
3. Thanom's contitutional government
4. Thanom's dictatorship government
5. Seni's civilian democratic government
6. Kukrit's civilian democratic government
7. Seni's civilian democratic government
8. Thanin's authoritarian government
9. Kriengsak's dictatorship government
10. Kriengsak's democratic government
11. Prem's democratic government (present)
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Decisions of an individual regime must
therefore reflect its purpose and priority
that should be expressed in its budget
policy.
Differences in goals and priorities were
also results of the four five-year develop-
ment plans promulgated, each of which
emphasized various development priorities
with estimated total expenditures.
During the years from 1960 to 1980 the
government appropriated large financial
resources to development. Budget financed
development expenditures, which were
fixed at 1,798 million baht or 22 percent of
the total expenditures in 1962, rose almost
ten times in 1971 to 16,457 million baht or
57 percent of the total expenditures, and in
1980 to 45,899.5 million baht or 42 percent
of the total expenditures. The total sum
of development expenditures for the First
Development Plan (1961-1966) was 32,646
million baht as compared to 65,'791 million
baht for the Second Plan (1967-1971), to
over 100,000 million baht for the Third
Plan (1972-1976) and to 252,450 million
baht for the Fourth Plan (1977--1981).
Thus, if the budget policy represents
rational actions, the budget appropriations
must maximize the stated objectives of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Changes
in the goals and objectives of the govern-
ment would bring about changes in budget
prionties. Therefore, an analysis of the
content of Thailand's budget policy and
appropriations during the period 1960-
1980, which covered seven different political
regimes and four promulgated development
plans, should disclose shifts in budget
priorities. The budgetary allocations of
each government should reflect the putative
purpose of that government. This per-
spective is diagrammed as follows:
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The above proposal is still incomplete
without an illustration of budgetary process
in which the macropolitical actors are in
control.
Basic guidelines for the budgetary process
in contemporary Thailand is the Budget
Procedure Act of 1959. Under its pro-
visions, the Budget Director is directly
responsible to the Prime lVlinister and has
the sole responsibility for directing and
managing his staff in formulating the
government budget policy. The Budget
Director must also determine an appro-
priate ceiling for expenditures and must
prepare an appropriation bill so that the
Prime Minister, after consulting with his
cabinet members, can submit the draft to
the legislature for approval or revision.
Ironically, in the Thai Cabinet system the
Prime Minister is in theory first among
equals, but in practice he is the leader whose
decisions are unlikely to be questioned in
the Cabinet meeting; hence he is in control
of the Cabinet's decision-making.
Upon receiving the draft, the legislative
body sets up an ad hoc committee to review
the proposal before passing it onto the
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floor of the legislative assembly. Because
of the executive domination of the Thai
government as discussed, the legislature
has been unable to exert much influence
over budgetary decisions.
Conclusion
The foregoing brief examination of Thai
budgetary politics suggests two distinct
models of analysis. The first model empha-
sizes an influential aspect of the budgetary
politics, i.e., subsystemic politics and bureau-
cratic allocations. This perspective leads
us to expect that budget decisions will be
incremental. The second model focuses
upon macropolitical actors, particularly
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and
leads us to expect that budget decisions
will be rational.
To date a systematic study of Thai
budgetary appropriations is lacking. These
two models hence suggest examining Thai
budgetary appropriations to see if the out-
puts of the budgetary process are incre-
mental and/or rational. This means that
four findings are possible: we may find
that budgetary decision-making of the
government of Thailand is (1) incremental,
(2) rational, (3) both incremental and
rational, or (4) neither incremental nor
rational.
The modernization of budgetary process
in 1960 introduced two major categories
of appropriations: functions and ministries.
Annually, the Budget Bureau publishes
the government budget document called
"Budget in Brief," in which these two
categories of appropriations are reported.
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Line items are also reported but they have
fewer implications for political analysis.
Therefore, in the first model we suggest
that budgetary appropriations by ministerial
category are examined to see how incremen-
tal budgeting decisions tended to be. In
the second model, budgetary appropriations
by functional category are examined to
see how rational budgeting decisions tended
to be.
One problem still remams. That is:
how can these two contradicting principles
be simultanously applicable to the Thai
case as suggested. Is not rational decision-
making the antithesis of incremental
decision-making? The answer is "Not
necessarily. " The key reasons are that
rational decision-making needs not preclude
incrementalism, and the two principles
occurred at different levels of analysis. The
question of how rational budgeting decisions
tend to be, is a systemic question. The
question of how incremental budgeting
decisions tend to be, is a subsystemic
question. The two analyses have different
units of analysis, different actors, different
stimuli, and different time references. Not
surprisingly then, these two different con-
ceptual lenses lead to two different con-
clusions. In short, by analyzing budgetary
appropriations at both the systemic and
subsystemic levels, one will have a much
more complete picture of how the politics
of budgeting is conducted in contemporary
Thailand.
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